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MODERNITY AND ITS RELIGIOUS DISCONTENTS:
CATHOLIC SOCIAL TEACHING AND
PUBLIC REASON
WILLIAM R. O'NEILL, S.J.*
Our world, lamented Weber, is "disenchanted."' Yet the
rights talk ofJohn Paul II, Desmond Tutu, or Martin Luther King
is hardly "godless and prophetless."2 Nor, as Islam's political
resurgence reminds us, have the "ultimate and most sublime val-
ues"3 retreated from public life.4 Here, too, religion is a stub-
born inheritance. But what is the role of religious belief in
complex, pluralist societies? Should religion disturb our
undogmatic legal slumbers? Or is the very notion of law as voca-
tion in a religiously pluralist polity necessarily "disenchanted"?
"What is the answer?" compels us to ask, like Gertrude Stein
on her deathbed, "What is the question?"5 For we differ not only
as to whether religion should figure in our public reason, but as
to the very meaning of our differences.6 In his magisterial trea-
tise on justice, John Rawls effectively brackets religious belief
* Associate Professor of Social Ethics at the Jesuit School of Theology at
Berkeley and the Graduate Theological Union. He is a visiting professor at
Hekima, Jesuit School of Theology in Nairobi, Kenya, and author of THE ETH-
ICS OF OUR CLIMATE: HERMENEUTICS AND ETHICAL THEORY (1994). The author is
grateful to William Rehg, S.J., for inviting him to discuss these themes at the
annual meeting of the Jesuit Philosophical Association in 2004.
1. Max Weber, Science as a Vocation, in FROM MAX WEBER: ESSAYS IN SOCI-
OLOGY 129, 148 (H. H. Gerth & C. Wright Mills trans. & eds., Oxford Univ. Press
1946).
2. Id. at 153.
3. Id. at 155.
4. See Peter Berger, Secularism in Retreat, in ISLAM AND SECULARISM IN THE
MIDDLE EAST 38 (John L. Esposito & Assam Tamini eds., 2000).
5. Suzy PLATr, RESPECTFULLY QUOTED: A DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS 189
(1993) (citing ELIZABETH SPRIGGE, GERTRUDE STEIN: HER LIFE AND WORK 265
(1957)).
6. See Immanuel Kant, What is Enlightenment?, in THE ENLIGHTENMENT: A
COMPREHENSIVE ANTHOLOGY 383, 385-88 (Peter Gay trans. & ed., 1973). For
Kant, "public reason" is principally that of the "scholar rationally addressing his
public .... Id. at 386. ForJohn Rawls, "public reason" represents our "shared
and public political reason." See JOHN RAwLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 9-11,
212-54 (1996) [hereinafter RAwLs, POLITICAL LIBERALISM]; John Rawls, The Idea
of Public Reason Revisited, 64 U. CHI. L. REv. 765-807, reprinted in JOHN RAWLS,
THE LAW OF PEOPLES 129 (1999) [hereinafter Rawls, The Idea of Public Reason
Revisited].
296 NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 20
under a " veil of ignorance."7 But for Michael Sandel, Rawls's
gambit of assimilating religious belief to a set of "self-imposed"
(or "self-authenticating") preferences belies its meaning as relig-
iousS-in Paul Tillich's words, a matter of "ultimate concern. '
In these pages, I wish to consider the public, political role of
religious belief in general and of Roman Catholic social teaching
on human rights in particular. For the Catholic Church's rap-
prochement with modernity is instructive. Citizens of faith, I
shall argue, need not confine their beliefs to the vestibule of pub-
lic reason, e.g., as private or nonpublic preferences; nor need
tolerance, at least respecting religion, be vacuous.' ° Recognizing
and respecting the faith of citizens entails, rather, a limited re-
enchantment of the public sphere-a deliberative tolerance."
Indeed, far from succumbing to modernity's discontents, relig-
ion may enrich public reason in the (i) justification, (ii) interpre-
tation, and (iii) explanation of our normative validity claims.
I. JUSTIFICATION
From its inception with Leo XIII's epochal encyclical, Rerum
Novarum in 1891, modern Roman Catholic social teaching
defended a rich, religiously inspired doctrine of the common
good (the bonum commune of the medieval schoolmen). Only
later would the modern rhetoric of human rights-through the
travails of the American theologian, John Courtney Murray in
particular-be grafted onto the tradition, most notably in John
XXIII's Pacem in Terris and the Conciliar texts, Gaudium et Spes
and Dignitatis Humanae.2 In a characteristically irenic turn,
7. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OFJUSTICE 118 (rev. ed. 1999) (1979). In later
writings, Rawls departs from such an "exclusive" conception in favor of an
"inclusive," and finally "wide" view of public reason. Cf ROBERT AUDI, RELIG-
IOUS COMMITMENT AND SECULAR REASON 86 (2000). In Audi's words, "one has a
(prima facie) obligation to abstain from advocacy or support of a law or public
policy that restricts human conduct, unless in advocating or supporting it one is
sufficiently motivated by (normatively) adequate secular reason.. .. " Id. at 96.
8. MICHAELJ. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE 192-93 (2d
ed. 1998) [hereinafter SANDEL, LIBERALISM].
9. See PAUL TILLICH, SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY: THREE VOLUMES IN ONE 11
(1967).
10. Cf MICHAELJ. PERRY, LOVE AND POWER: THE ROLE OF RELIGION AND
MORALITY IN AMERICAN POLITICS (1991); MICHAELJ. PERRY, MORALITY, POLITICS,
AND LAW: A BICENTENNIAL ESSAY (1988); Robin W. Lovin, Perry, Naturalism, and
Religion in Public, 63 TUL. L. REv. 1517 (1989); John P. Reeder Jr., What is a
Religious Ethic?, 25.3J. RELIGIOUS ETHICS 157 (1998).
11. See, e.g., SANDEL, supra note 8, at 216.
12. See CHARLES CURRAN, CATHOLIC SOCIAL TEACHING 1891-PRESENT: A
HISTORICAL, THEOLOGICAL, AND ETHICAL ANALYSIS (2002); DAVID HOLLENBACH,
THE COMMON GOOD AND CHRISTIAN ETHICS (2002) [hereinafter HOLLENBACH,
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Pope John resolves the seeming antinomy of the "politics of the
common good" and the "politics of [human] rights," by stipula-
tive fiat. 3 Pacem in Terris glosses the pre-modern teleology of
Mater et Magistra (depicting the common good as "the sum total
of those conditions of social living, whereby [we] are enabled to
achieve [our] own integral perfection"' 4 ) in deontological terms
of human rights: "It is agreed that in our time the common good
is chiefly guaranteed when personal rights and duties are
maintained."' 5
Limited internally by the like dignity or intrinsic worth of
others, liberty is positively oriented to the good of moral commu-
nity as, in Jacques Maritain's words, "a whole composed of
wholes,"16 i.e., neither an artifice of interest, as in liberal con-
tractarian thought, nor the "local and ethnocentric" hypostasis of
communitarian mores."7 We realize the limited good of moral
community in which all share singly, not en masse, when the
"inviolable rights of the human person," including religious lib-
COMMON GOOD]. Cf POPE JOHN XXIII, ENCYCLICAL LETTER PACEM IN TERRIS
Nos. 53-66, 132-41 (1963) [hereinafter PACEM IN TERRIS]; POPE JOHN PAUL II,
ENCYCLICAL LETTER SOLLICITUDO REI SocIALIs Nos. 38-40 (1987) [hereinafter
SOLLICITUDO REI SOCIALIS]; POPE PAUL VI, ENCYCLICAL LETTER POPULORUM
PROGRESSIO Nos. 22-24, 43-75 (1967); SECOND VATICAN ECUMENICAL COUNCIL,
DIGNITATIS HUMANAE Nos. 6-7 (1965) [hereinafter DIGNITATIS HuMANAE]; SEC-
OND VATICAN ECUMENICAL COUNCIL, GAUDIUM ET SPES Nos. 25, 30 (1965) [here-
inafter GAUDIUM ET SPES].
13. Michael Sandel, Introduction to LIBERALISM AND ITS CRITICS 1, 6
(Michael Sandel ed., 1984).
14. PACEM IN TERRIS, supra note 12, No. 58 (citing POPE JOHN XXIII,
ENCYCLICAL LETTER MATER ET MAGISTRA No. 53 (1961)).
15. PACEM IN TERRIS, supra note 12, No. 60. The statement continues:
The chief concern of civil authorities must therefore be to ensure that
these rights are acknowledged, respected, coordinated with other
rights, defended and promoted, so that in this way each one may more
easily carry out his duties. For "to safeguard the inviolable rights of
the human person, and to facilitate the fulfillment of his duties,
should be the chief duty of every public authority."
Id. (citation omitted). Such a rights-based interpretation permits Pope John to
extend the common good globally. See Pope Pius XII, Radio Address on Pente-
cost Sunday Commemorating "The Fiftieth Anniversary of Rerum Novarum,"
Nos. 20-23 (1941). Cf DIGNITATIS HUMANAE, supra note 12, No. 26; GAUDIUM
ET SPES, supra note 12, No. 26.
16. JACQUES MARITAIN, THE PERSON AND THE COMMON GOOD 47 (John J.
Fitzgerald trans., 1947).
17. Richard Rorty, The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in THE VIRGINIA
STATUTE FOR RELIGIOUS FREEDOM: ITS EVOLUTION AND CONSEQUENCES IN AMERI-
CAN HISTORY 259 (Merrill D. Peterson & Robert C. Vaughan eds., 1988). Cf
Richard Rorty, Human Rights, Rationality and Sentimentality, in THE POLITICS OF
HUMAN RIGHTS 67, 71, 78 (Obrad Savic ed., 1999).
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erty, are protected in what Murray defines as "public order".18 In
a notable "development" of Church doctrine, establishing "true
religion," e.g., imposing distinctively religious duties, falls outside
the state's proper province for the common good-now "chiefly
guaranteed," says Pope John, in the set of basic, institutional
arrangements supporting a rights regime.19
In the Church's modern doctrine, religious reasons do not,
then, supplant public, political reasons, e.g., basic human rights,
which, says Rawls, "may reasonably be accepted by other citizens
as a justification" for "political action."' Distinctively Christian
duties, e.g., love of enemies, forgiveness, etc., rather presume, or
supervene upon the recognition of basic human rights claims,
e.g.,juridical protection of victims' rights. The Christian disciple
'justices"-"acts justly" in the prophet's words2-even as justice
bears the mark of "loving tenderly."22 But in modern Catholic
social teaching, love of the disciple who "walks humbly with her
God" is never less than just.
One might, of course, still dismiss the Church's belated
"turn" to rights as, in Rorty's words, "merely quaint."24 But there
is, I believe, a rich vein to be mined in Pope John's teaching. 25
Let me elaborate. As I have argued elsewhere, pace Bentham
(who famously dismissed "natural rights" as "rhetorical non-
sense"26 ), the "sense" of rights rests precisely in their persuasive,
rhetorical force.2 7 Victims' rights against torture warrant their
claim that others respect their basic security, so that we may dis-
18. See JOHN COURTNEY MURRAY, WE HOLD THESE TRUTHS: CATHOLIC
REFLECTIONS ON THE AMERICAN PROPOSITION 155-74 (1960). Cf John Courtney
Murray, Memo to Cardinal Cushing Concerning Contraception Legislation, in BRIDG-
ING THE SACRED AND THE SECULAR: SELECTED WRITINGS OFJOHN COURTNEY MUR-
RAY, S.J. 81-86 (J. Leon Hooper ed., 1994).
19. See DIGNITATIS HUMANAE, supra note 12, No. 4. "Positive," correlative
duties to preserve and protect agents' basic capabilities (the objects of basic
rights) generate such structural imperatives, e.g., the state's obligation to guar-
antee citizens' basic welfare. See ALAN GEWIRTH, THE COMMUNITY OF RIGHTS
106-65 (1996).
20. RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 6, at xlvi.
21. Micah 6:8.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. RICHARD RORTY, CONTINGENCY, IRONY, AND SOLIDARITY 45 (1989).
25. See David Hollenbach, A Communitarian Reconstruction of Human Rights:
Contributions from Catholic Tradition, in CATHOLICISM AND LIBERALISM: CONTRIBU-
TIONS TO AMERICAN PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY 127 (R. Bruce Douglass & David Hol-
lenbach eds., 1994).
26. SeeJeremy Bentham, Anarchical Fallacies, in 2 WoRKS 489, 501 (1843).
27. See William O'Neill, The Children of Babel: Reconstructing the Common
Good, in 18 ANNUAL OF THE SOCIETY OF CHRISTIAN ETHICS 161-76 (1998). Cf
CH. PERELMAN & L. OLBRECHTS-TYTECA, THE NEW RHETORIC: A TREATISE ON
MODERNITY AND ITS RELIGIOUS DISCONTENTS
tinguish such practical, rational rhetoric from merely strategic or
coercive uses. Human rights, in turn, show forth our respect for
what the Universal Declaration calls the "dignity and worth of the
human person;" while basic human rights preserve the condi-
tions (or capabilities) of practically rational, discursive agency.2 8
In ascribing worth, rather than mere price to persons as agents,
we implicitly valorize the prerequisites of their exercising agency,
i.e., not only our negative, civil liberties, but basic security and
subsistence upheld by the Catholic encyclical tradition.29
Rights, we might say, thus exhibit the banality of goodness
rather than "the ultimate and most sublime values" of our com-
prehensive (religious) doctrines. As the "deep grammar" of pub-
lic reasoning-rather than a free-standing "meta-narrative" or
"meta-vocabulary"-claim-rights configure such doctrines, estab-
lishing their limited family resemblance. 0 And, as in the Univer-
sal Declaration, this family resemblance underwrites an
"overlapping consensus" regarding citizens' "faith in fundamen-
tal human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human per-
son."31 Citizens thus recognize the justificatory, rhetorical force
of general claim-rights for policy, even if they differ as to the ulti-
mate justification of such rights themselves, e.g., belief in the
imago dei. It suffices for deliberative consensus that citizens' best
judgments overlap; consensus need not "go all the way down. 32
Indeed, consensus is "reasonable" only if it respects (a) the iden-
tity of general claim-rights (public reasons) and (b) the differ-
ARGUMENTATION 13-62 (John Wilkinson & Purcell Weaver trans., 1969); CH.
PERELMAN, THE REALM OF RHETORIC 1-8 (William Kluback trans., 1982).
28. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, in BLACKSTONE'S INTERNATIONAL
HUMAN RIGHTS DOCUMENTS 21, 22 (P.R. Ghandhi ed., 2d ed. 2000) [hereinafter
Universal Declaration of Human Rights].
29. HENRY SHUE, BASIC RIGHTS: SUBSISTENCE, AFFLUENCE, AND U.S. FOR-
EIGN POLICY 5-87 (1980). Alan Gewirth terms these "the generic goods of
agency," inasmuch as they are presupposed in any reasonable conception of
flourishing or perfection. See ALAN GEWIRTH, HUMAN RIGHTS: ESSAYS ONJUSTIFI-
CATION AND APPLICATIONS 38-41 (1982). Cf GEWIRTH, THE COMMUNITY OF
RIGHTS, supra note 19, at 31-70.
30. Such a reading of fights offers a via media between a "thick" ground-
ing of rights in comprehensive liberalism and a "thin," purely political
interpretation.
31. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 28, at 22. I may thus
offer distinctive reasons for my faith in dignity, even if the sense or meaning of
dignity is not, in Michael Perry's words, "ineliminably religious." MICHAEL J.
PERRY, THE IDEA OF HUMAN RIGHTS: FOUR INQUIRIES 11-14 (1998). See also infra
note 95 and accompanying text.
32. Cf Donald Davidson, Actions, Reasons, and Causes, in ESSAYS ON
ACTIONS AND EVENTS 3 (1980); Donald Davidson, Intending, in ESSAYS ON
ACTIONS AND EVENTS 83 (1980).
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ence of citizens' (ultimate) reasons for redeeming them. In
Andrey Sahkarov's words:
The ideology of human rights is probably the only one
which can be combined with such diverse ideologies as
communism, social democracy, religion, technocracy and
those ideologies which may be described as national and
indigenous. It can also serve as a foothold for those ...
who have tired of the abundance of ideologies, none of
which have brought . . . simple human happiness. The
defense of human rights is a clear path toward the unifica-
tion of people in our turbulent world, and a path toward
the relief of suffering.
33
We need not, then, succumb to Burke's "delusive geometri-
cal accuracy." 4 On the contrary, our "defense of human rights"
recalls the origins of modern rights discourse. For the "idea of
natural rights," argues Brian Tierney, was not originally "depen-
dent on any particular version of Western philosophy;" rather, "it
coexisted with a variety of philosophies, including the religiously
oriented systems of the medieval era and the secularized doc-
trines of the Enlightenment. '3 5 Just so, consensus in public rea-
soning is given, not as a formal, axiomatic system, reducible to a
closed set of public reasons, but rather as a historically developing
web of belief-a web comprising many strands, including "relig-
iously oriented systems" of belief.3
6
We may, of course, say with Wittgenstein, "This is simply
what I do," when "I have exhausted the [public] justifications" for
human rights practice.3 7 The grammar of rights need not, as
Kant believed, be transcendentally justified, independently of all
experience. (Conscience need not make Kantians of us all-in
33. Bums H. Weston, Human Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE WORLD
COMMUNITY: ISSUES AND ACTION 14, 30 (Richard Pierre Claude & Burns H. Wes-
ton eds. 2d ed., 1989).
34. 1 EDMUND BURKE, Speech on Moving His Resolutions for Conciliation
With the Colonies (1775), in THE WORMs OF THE RIcrr HONOURABLE EDMUND
BURKE 450, 501 (1854).
35. See BRIAN TIERNEY, THE IDEA OF NATURAL RIGHTS: STUDIES ON NATU-
RAL RIGHTS, NATURAL LAW AND CHURCH LAW, 1150-1625, at 347 (1997). Cf.
ANNABEL S. BRETTF, LIBERTY, RIGHT AND NATURE: INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS IN LATER
SCHOLASTIC THOUGHT (1997).
36. TIERNEY, supra note 35, at 347 (interpreting the Rawlsian idea of an
"overlapping consensus" as a developing web of belief guards against viewing
public reasons as a discrete "meta-vocabulary" or "meta-language.") Strands of
public argument, rather, may be distinguished, yet not fully separated (or
unraveled) from the web as a whole.
37. LUDWIG WIF-rGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS 85e (G.E.M.
Anscombe trans., Blackwell Publishers, 2d ed. 1997).
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the unmediated apperception of Kantian "respect"). But we may
still speak of a theological "bedrock," i.e., distinctively religious
grounding reasons exhibiting "what I do" (my se/fknowledge) in
honoring the proper political virtues of civility, tolerance, reason-
ableness, et al."s Dignity understood "from the standpoint of
divine revelation"39 may accordingly play an ultimate justificatory
role in our "faith in fundamental human rights."4 ° And such
"grounding reasons" may differ41 : as the drafters of the Universal
Declaration foresaw, Christians, Jews, Moslems, and Buddhists
may root their "faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity
and worth of the human person" in their respective narrative
traditions.42
II. INTERPRETATION
In the preceding section, I argued that religious, compre-
hensive conceptions provide what Rawls calls "grounding rea-
sons," precisely inasmuch as "the roots of democratic citizens'
allegiance to their political conceptions lie in their respective
comprehensive doctrines."43 What I do in invoking "thin" public
reasons of the law is distinct, yet finally inseparable from what I
do, e.g., my vocation, in grounding or rooting such reasons in
"thick" religious belief. Indeed for Rawls's political (non-coin-
38. For Habermas too, the unschematized, or in his words "unsaturated"
character of modern moral rights requires positive, interpretative specification;
but there seems no compelling reason to restrict our ethical (sittliche) inheri-
tance to the dogmatically secular. A formal-pragmatic vindication of rights-
one, that is, that renounces a transcendental foundation-cannot deny, a pri-
ori, the "logical force" of religion. Habermas, ironically, turns his spade on the
very religious grounding reasons he would deny. See JORGEN HABERMAS,
BETWEEN FACTS AND NoRMs 97 (William Rehg trans., Mass. Inst. Tech. 1996).
Cf WILLIAM REHG, INSIGHT AND SOLIDARITY: A STUDY IN THE DISCOURSE ETHICS
OFJORGEN HABERMAS 82-131 (1994).
39. PACEM IN TERRIS, supra note 12, No. 10.
40. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 28, at 22. Cf DANIEL
A. DOMBROWSKI, RAWLS AND RELIGION: THE CASE FOR POLITICAL LIBERALISM
114-16 (2001); PAULJ. WEITHMAN, RELIGION AND THE OBLIGATIONS OF CITIZEN-
SHIP 148-79 (2002).
41. SeeYEs TO A GLOBAL ETHIC (Hans King ed., 1996). Cf DAVID LITTLE
& SUMNER B. Twiss, COMPARATIVE RELIGIOUS ETHICS: A NEW METHOD (1978);
Sumner B. Twiss, Comparative Ethics and Intercultural Human-Rights Dialogues: A
Programmatic Inquiry, in CHRISTIAN ETHICS: PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS 357-78
(Lisa Sowle Cahill & James F. Childress eds., 1996); ROBERT T RR, FAITH IN
HUMAN RIGHTS: SUPPORT IN RELIGIOUS TRADITIONS FOR A GLOBAL STRUGGLE
(1991) (arguing in support of an ecumenical and interreligious consensus on
the rhetoric of dignity and human rights).
42. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 28, at 22.
43. RAwLs, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 6, at Iv n.30; Rawls, The Idea
of Public Revisited, supra note 6, at 153.
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prehensive) liberalism, the very stability of a rights regime rests
on the "overlapping consensus" of such reasonable, comprehen-
sive doctrines.44 Citizens' judgments, e.g., that civil rights be
extended to disenfranchised minorities, are thus neither logically
nor semantically independent of their full comprehensive
beliefs. Religious beliefs figure not only in the justification but,
as in Rawls's most recent writings, in the interpretation/applica-
tion of such rights.
Inspired by King's legacy and the writings of Murray, Rawls
relaxes the strictures of his earlier "method of avoidance."45 His
revised or "wide view" of public reason now permits reasonable
(religious) comprehensive doctrines to "be introduced in public
reason at any time," provided that public reasons, in accordance
with the duty of civility, are duly presented.46 While "the wide
view of public political culture" permits us, in Rawls's words, to
introduce "the familiar story of the Good Samaritan," his "pro-
viso" bids us to 'justify our proposal in terms of proper political
values."47 In their recent pastoral letter on the economy, for
instance, the U.S. bishops introduce this very story as an exem-
plary narrative of the "dual command of love that is at the basis
44. See RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 6, at xlvii; Rawls, The Idea
of Public Reason Revisited, supra note 6, at 179-80; see also Martin Luther King, Jr.,
Letter from Birmingham City Jail (Apr. 16, 1963), in A TESTAMENT OF HOPE: THE
ESSENTIAL WRITINGS OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. 298 (James Melvin Washing-
ton ed., 1986). King appeals to an overlapping consensus of the Scriptures; the
writings of Augustine, Aquinas, Luther, John Bunyan, Tillich, and Rienhold
Niebuhr; the Jewish theologian, Martin Buber; as well asJefferson and Lincoln.
Id.
45. RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 6, at 9-11, 150-54; John
Rawls, The Idea of an Overlapping Consensus, 7 OXFORD JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES
1, 12-13 (1987) [hereinafter Rawls, Overlapping Consensus].
46. The ideal of public reason, and the duty of civility it implies, is real-
ized whenever judges, legislators, chief executives, and other government offi-
cials, as well as citizens, viewed as "ideal legislators," explain to other citizens
"their reasons for supporting fundamental political positions in terms of the
political conception ofjustice they regard as the most reasonable." Rawls, The
Idea of Public Reason Revisited, supra note 6, at 135-37. See also RAWLS, POLITICAL
LIBERALISM, supra note 6, at xlvi, 217. Political conceptions are reasonable only
if they satisfy the criterion of reciprocity: our exercise of political power is
proper "only when we sincerely believe that the reasons we offer for our politi-
cal action may reasonably be accepted by other citizens as a justification of
those actions." Id.
47. Rawls, The Idea of Public Reason Revisited, supra note 6, at 146. See also
RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 6, at li-lii. For an analogous argu-
ment, see KENT GREENAWALT, RELIGIOUS CONVICrION AND POLITICAL CHOICE
(1988).
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of all Christian morality."48 Enjoining "mutual care and respect"
for the dignity or "sacredness of every person as a creature
formed in the image and likeness of God," such neighbor-love, in
turn, is "made real" in redeeming persons' fundamental rights.
4 9
For such basic rights to security, subsistence, and civil liberties,
say the bishops, are "prerequisites for a dignified life in commu-
nity"-the moral charter of "public order."5 °
In their modern-day "reading of the law," i.e., as redeeming
the human rights of the neighbor in need, the bishops, in Rawls'
words, thus manifest their allegiance to "the democratic ideal of
public reason."51 In satisfying the Rawlsian proviso, the bishops
ratify their "commitment to constitutional democracy" and the
duty of civility-political virtues, says Rawls, upon which our over-
lapping consensus depends.52 But manifesting their allegiance is
not logically antecedent to, or independent of public reason-
ing-it is just what citizens, including citizens of faith, do in real-
izing "the democratic ideal." The family resemblance, or
overlapping consensus of reasonable, comprehensive doctrines is
not only presumed in the background of, but realized or exhib-
ited performatively in public reasoning.
Satisfying the Rawlsian proviso attests to our common "faith in
fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the
human person," a faith which, the drafters of the Universal Dec-
laration recognized, is rooted in differing sacred and secular tra-
ditions.53 (The "grammar" of rights is thus neither sacred nor
secular per se, but, in Rawls's terms, properly "political".) Such
satisfaction, moreover, may be implicit, as in King's "Letter from
Birmingham City Jail" in which civic and religious narratives are
intertwined, or even symbolic, as when "young ministers of the
gospel and a host of their elders" engaged in nonviolent resis-
tance.5" Religious literacy, in turn, permits us to "see" the latent
48. U.S. CATHOLIC BISHOPS, ECONOMIC JUSTICE FOR ALL No. 43, available
at http://www.osjspm.org/cst/eja.htm (1986) [hereinafter EcoNoMic JUSTICE
FOR ALL]; see also POPE JOHN PAUL II, ENCYCLICAL LETTER CENTESIMUS ANNUS No.
51 (1991). John Paul II likewise recurs to the parable in enjoining "attentive
and pressing concern for one's neighbour in a moment of need." Id.
49. ECONOMIC JUSTICE FOR ALL, supra note 48, Nos. 68, 79.
50. Id. No. 79.
51. Id. Nos. 43, 68, 79.
52. See Rawls, The Idea of Public Reason Revisited, supra note 6, at 153-54; See
also RAwLs, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 6, at xlvi-li; Rawls, Overlapping Con-
sensus, supra note 45, at 17.
53. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 28, at 22.
54. King, supra note 44, at 302. In King's words:
One day the South will know that when these disinherited children of
God sat down at lunch counters, they were in reality standing up for
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family resemblance aright, allaying doubts "about one another's
allegiance to basic constitutional and political values," e.g.,
King's or Tutu's nonviolent resistance.55 And so the benefits of
citizens' mutual knowledge of the comprehensive religious doc-
trines in which such allegiance is rooted, says Rawls, "bring out a
positive ground for introducing such doctrines"-one finally
irreducible to mere "self-imposed" or "self-authenticating"
preferences.5 6
Explicit recognition of our latent wisdom may, of course, be
fitting, e.g., when contesting a particular, grammatical remark
(rights claim). Yet we need not say that "citizens of faith who cite
the Gospel parable of the Good Samaritan" must "go on to give a
public justification for the parable's conclusions in terms of polit-
ical values."57 For Rawls himself acknowledges that "proper,
political values" may remain inchoate, e.g., for "the Abolitionists
and those in the Civil Rights Movement": "The proviso was ful-
filled in their cases, however much they emphasized the religious
roots of their doctrines because these doctrines supported basic
constitutional values-as they themselves asserted-and so sup-
ported reasonable conceptions of political justice."5
We need not, then, insist upon juridically parsing Tutu's
condemnation of apartheid as "veritably blasphemous . . . like
spitting in the face of God."59 Nor need we trim King's "Letter
from Birmingham CityJail" or the U.S. bishops' pastoral letter of
religious reference. Under the rubrics of deliberative tolerance,
religious literacy lets us rightly interpret such "rights talk." But,
so too, citizens' mutual knowledge enriches their practice of
human rights.6 ° For the grammar of rights is not self-interpret-
what is best in the American dream and for the most sacred values in
our Judeo-Christian heritage, thereby bringing our nation back to
those great wells of democracy which were dug deep by the founding
fathers in their formulation of the Constitution and the Declaration of
Independence.
Id.
55. Rawls, The Idea of Public Reason Revisited, supra note 6, at 153-54; see
also HOLLENBACH, COMMON GOOD, supra note 12, at 168 (stating that what Rawls
calls "the reasonable". [is] forged in the interaction that forms the rich give-
and-take among the diverse communities that form culture and civil society,
including religious communities."); cf DAVID HOLLENBACH, THE GLOBAL FACE
OF PUBLIC FAITH: POLITICS, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND CHRISTIAN ETHICS (2003);
SANDEL, LIBERALISM, supra note 8.
56. Rawls, The Idea of Public Reason Revisited, supra note 6, at 154.
57. Id. at 155.
58. Id. at 154-55.
59. DESMOND MPILo TUTU, No FUTURE WITHOUT FORGIVENESS 11 (1999).
60. Cf NICHOLAS WOLTERSTORFF & ROBERT AUDI, RELIGION IN THE PUBLIC
SQUARE: THE PLACE OF RELIGIOUS CONVICTIONS IN PUBLIC DEBATE (1997);
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ing (as warrants, rights justify, but do not fully explain or ration-
alize action). Redeeming my claim-right that others do, or
refrain from doing, A presumes the morally relevant description
of A. But that A is rightly described, e.g., as redeeming my claim-
rights to civil liberty, is not simply given. Moral perceptions must
be tutored, e.g., by what Martin Luther King called the "strong,"
"persistent," and "determined action" of the African-American
and African churches.6" "The Bible," said Tutu, "turned out to
be the most subversive book imaginable in a situation of injustice
and oppression."62
Consider the implications of our reflections on basic rights
as the "depth grammar" of our public reasoning in section (i): In
a variation of what Rawls would term imperfect procedural jus-
tice,63 basic rights (a) constitutively specify the political aims of
public reason, i.e., the common good as the culturally integrated
embodiment of a rights regime; and (b) regulatively govern politi-
cal deliberation, i.e., in ensuring fair and effective participation
of all affected.64 In (a), the heritage of nonviolent resistance for
King or the rituals of social reconciliation for Tutu, model the
culturally fitting redemption of basic rights-and, in particular,
the positive duties of institutional legal protection and provision
entailed by a rights regime. In (b), religiously affiliated institu-
tions of civil society play a notable role, both in promoting a cul-
turally fitting ethos of rights and in generating the social capital
expended in their defense, e.g., the political mobilization of the
black churches.65
In neither case is religion merely epiphenomenal to public
reason-as Walzer might say, public reason is thick (in invoking
religious wisdom) before it is thin (redeeming proper political
values) .66 Considerable variations may, of course, be rung on
Nicholas Wolterstorff, An Engagement with Rorty, 31 J. RELIGIOUS ETHICS 129,
129-39.
61. King, supra note 44, at 298.
62. TUTU, supra note 59, at 11.
63. See RAwLS, supra note 7, at 85.
64. Procedural norms would govern policy where neither rights nor civic
virtues suffice to generate sufficient consensus regarding policy. In such vexed
cases, we should, I believe, err on the side of liberty, even if we do not thereby
generate a new legal "right."
65. See JEROME BAGGETT, HABITAT FOR HUMANITY: BUILDING PRIVATE
HOMES, BUILDING PUBLIC RELIGION (2001); Robert D. Putnam, Bowling Alone:
America's Declining Social Capital, 6J. DEMOCRACIES 65 (1995); Robert D. Putnam,
The Prosperous Community: Social Capital and Public Life, 13 AM. PROSPECT 35
(1993).
66. See MICHAEL WALZER, THICK AND THIN: MORAL ARGUMENT AT HOME
AND ABROAD 21-25 (1994).
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these themes-the American civil rights movement inspired civil
resistance against apartheid in South Africa, just as Ghandi's
ahimsa inspired King. But the cultural embodiment of rights pre-
cludes simple emulation. Far, then, from comprising a mere
calculus of interests, public reasoning shapes public reasons,
enriching our moral/legal repertory. What David Hollenbach
aptly describes as the "constant symbiosis and mutual influence"
of faith and public reason is thus yet a further "positive ground
for introducing such [comprehensive, religious] doctrines."67
Yet neither are such positive grounds restricted merely to
ratifying a prevailing consensus or redeeming public reasons-
for as Rawls says, "the content of public reason is not fixed"-our
public reasoning may be distorted, even systematically so.6" As
the heritage of racism reveals, the "ideal of public reason"-the
telos of the civic common good-is, at best, imperfectly realized
in our public, political culture. Introducing the Gospel story of
the Good Samaritan reminds us that the "dictates of convention
and prejudice"69 conspire against our heeding what King called
the "deep groans and passionate yearnings of those that have
been oppressed."7 Religious comprehensive "grounding" rea-
sons may thus implicitly satisfy the Rawlsian proviso by revising
public reasons. Indeed, where political values are distorted, real-
izing the ideal of public reason, may, in Rawls's words, "require
that [religious] comprehensive reasons be invoked,"'" i.e., rea-
sons distinctively, though not uniquely religious.
In a similar vein, the United States bishops invoke the para-
ble of the Good Samaritan, not only to ratify the prevailing politi-
cal consensus; but to rectify its lacunae, namely the legal
restriction of rights to civil-political liberties-"negative" rights,
says Robert Nozick, that "fill the space of rights."72 In Chapter
Two of their pastoral letter, the bishops affirm the inseparability
67. HOLLENBACH, COMMON GOOD, supra note 12, at 168-69. Hollenbach
cites King's exemplary leadership of the civil rights movement. Id.
68. RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 6, at liii.
69. In his exegesis of the parable of the Good Samaritan, Wolfgang
Schrage writes, "The exemplary narrative shows that the obligation to love has
no limits: love does not reach a boundary beyond which nothing is required."
WOLFGANG SCHRAGE, THE ETHICS OF THE NEW TESTAMENT 74, 76 (David E.
Green trans., Fortress Press 1988) (1982). For "love does not follow the dictates
of convention and prejudice but dares to ignore them, dares with sovereign
freedom to surmount the barriers that separate people. A person who loves can
see in anyone a neighbor in need." Id.
70. King, supra note 44, at 298.
71. RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 6, at 251 n.41 (emphasis
added).
72. ROBERT NozIcK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 238 (1974).
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of "negative" and "positive" basic human rights-a view already
implied by Article 22 of the Universal Declaration, which recog-
nizes the "indispensable" character of "positive" rights, and as
Mary Ann Glendon notes, "connects them to traditional protec-
tions of the individual."7  The Declaration, says Glendon,
presumes "that one set of values could not long endure without
the other ... a better standard of living cannot be accomplished
without larger freedom," just as "freedom is threatened by dehu-
manizing living conditions."74 Drawing "on the resources of the
Catholic moral-religious tradition"-even as they appeal to the
wider moral-legal tradition of international law-the bishops
propose "a 'New American Experiment' in "securing economic
rights: the creation of an order that guarantees the minimum
conditions of human dignity in the economic sphere for every
person."
7 5
III. EXPLANATION
In appealing to the "Catholic moral-religious tradition," the
bishops, as King and Tutu, display the distinct, yet finally insepa-
rable interplay of thick religious grounding reasons and thin
public reasons in our public reasoning: "what we do" in weaving a
web of belief. No simple algorithm tells us whether the Rawlsian
proviso must be satisfied explicitly. Sometimes our fides implicita
in human rights suffices. Sometimes, especially in rectifying pub-
lic reason, we must give an account of our faith, e.g., King's
appeal to religious and comprehensive liberal warrants, or in the
United States bishops' defense of the rights of the poor.76 For
here, too, argument is necessary-critics were quick to object
that the Church's "option for the poor" represented a fideistic
departure from justice as fairness. How then to translate the
"Catholic moral-religious" defense of an "option for the poor"
into a political (or properly catholic) idiom?
The "familiar story of the Good Samaritan" comes again to
our aid. For impartial regard for my neighbor's rights justifies
73. MARY ANN GLENDON, A WORLD MADE NEW 187 (2001).
74. Id. at 202; cf id. at 238 (emphasizing the Universal Declaration's "link
between freedom and social security"). Article 22 affirms:
Everyone, as a member of society, has the right to social security
and is entitled to realization, through national effort and international
cooperation and in accordance with the organization and resources of
each State, of the economic, social and cultural rights indispensable
for his dignity and for the free development of his personality.
Id. at 187.
75. ECONOMIC JUSTICE FOR ALL, supra note 48, at Nos. 21, 95.
76. King, supra note 44, at 293.
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preferential attention for my neighbor in distress. Luke's narra-
tive reveals the boundless, universal scope of love precisely in
joining a moral solidarity with those who suffer-my "neighbor,
the masses."7 7 Thus the lesson that our moral/legal entitlement
to equal respect or consideration justifies preferential treatment
for those whose basic rights are most imperiled 78-in Camus's
phrase, our taking "the victim's side."79 Such a discriminate
response finds expression in the graduated legal/moral urgency
of differing human rights, i.e., the lexical priority of agents' basic
rights over other, less exigent claims, e.g., property rights; and in
the differing material conditions presumed for realizing the
same human rights.8"
A regime of rights may accordingly embody a legislative or
juridical preference for the least favored in society, e.g., poor
women and their families, and differential material entitlements
corresponding to the differing interpersonal prerequisites of
agency, e.g., the greater nutritional needs of pregnant women.81
"Passing to the victims' side[,]" 82 i.e., redeeming the rights of the
poor, including their rights to effective, civic participation,
emerges as a touchstone of the legitimacy of our prevailing insti-
tutional arrangements. Luke's parable, we may say, becomes the
"moral squint"83 through which citizens of faith see84 and
respond compassionately,85 lest like the priest and Levite of the
tale, "members of the oppressor race" in King's words, too read-
ily "see and pass by[.] ' 86
Now, it is just this concrete determination, the narratively
embodied rights claim, that typically moves us to act. When Tutu
introduces the Gospel parable of the Good Samaritan in con-
demning apartheid as "vicious, evil, unchristian" because, like
77. M.D. Chenu, Les Masses Pauvres, in EGLISE ET PAUVRETt 169 (1965); see
also Schrage, supra note 69, at 78, 81.
78. See GENE OUTKA, AGAPE: AN ETHICAL ANALYSIs 20 (1972); cf. RONALD
DWoRKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 227 (1978).
79. ALBERT CAMUS, THE PLAGUE 230 (1960).
80. Cf SOLLICITUDO REi SOCIALIs, supra note 12, at Nos. 42-43; cf Official
Conclusions of the Third General Conference of Latin America Bishops, con-
vened at Puebla, Mexico, Jan. 1979, reprinted in PUEBLA AND BEYOND: DOCUMEN-
TATION AND COMMENTARY 123-285 (John Eagleson & Philip Scharper eds.,John
Drury trans., 1979).
81. See JEAN DREZE & AMARTYA SEN, HUNGER AND PUBLIC ACTION 37-42
(1989).
82. Luke 10:34.
83. The phrase "moral squint" is drawn from ROBERT BOLT, A MAN FOR
ALL SEASONS 19 (Vintage Int'l ed. 1990) (1960).
, L,,uke 10:30.
85. Luke 10:33.
86. Luke 10:32.
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the robbers on the way to Jericho, it "artificially and deliberately"
induces need, "causing suffering to many people," he is still play-
ing the language game of human rights.8 7 Precisely as ground-
ing reasons (section i): "what is written in the law"8 ; religious
attitudes and beliefs, we saw, likewise interpret action (section ii):
"who is my neighbor?"89 and fix motives: "Go and do likewise. ' O
The "Catholic moral-religious tradition," say the bishops, under-
writes "a new cultural consensus that the basic economic condi-
tions of human welfare are essential to human dignity and are
due persons by right;" even as it funds "the securing of these
rights."'" No less do the bishops appeal to their magisterial
authority in interpreting the tradition today, seeking "to shape a
constituency of conscience, measuring every policy by how it
touches the least, the lost, and the left-out among us."92 And
such a "constituency of conscience" applies perforce to the
Church itself. For the "Church cannot redeem the world from
the deadening effects of sin and injustice unless it is working to
remove sin and injustice in its own life and institutions.""
Still, there is surplus of religious meaning.94 For though our
rights talk is not, pace Michael Perry, "ineliminably religious,"
still "going and doing likewise" bears a religious imprimatur.95
To heed Jesus' command as the summary of the law is not merely
to comply with our neighbors' rights in answer to the lawyer's
question (what Karl Rahner terms the "essentialist" requirements
of morality96). For to the lawyer's question in the parable, "Who
87. DESMOND TUTU, Love Reveals My Neighbour, in HOPE AND SUFFERING:
SERMONS AND SPEECHES 150, 152 (John Webster ed., 1984) (1983).
88. Luke 10: 26.
89. Luke 10: 29.
90. Luke 10: 37.
91. ECONOMIC JUSTICE FOR ALL, supra note 48, at No. 83.
92. Id. at No. 27. The bishops acknowledge the differing moral authority
of precepts and application, yet wish the latter "to be given serious considera-
tion by Catholics." Id. at No. 135.
93. Id. at No. 24. Cf id. at Nos. 338-39.
94. Cf PAUL RICOEUR, INTERPRETATION THEORY: DISCOURSE AND THE SUR-
PLUS OF MEANING (1976).
95. PERRY, supra note 31. Cf Max Stackhouse, Human Rights and Public
Theology, in RELIGION AND HUMAN RIGHTS: COMPETING CLAIMS? 13 (Carrie Gus-
tafson & PeterJuviler eds., 1999).
96. See 2 KARL RAHNER, On the Question of a Formal Existential Ethics, in THE-
OLOGICAL INVESTIGATIONS: MAN IN THE CHURCH 217-34 (Karl H. Kruger trans.,
1963). Essential ethics refers to the set of universal, action-guiding moral
norns ascertained by natural reason (e.g., respect for persons' basic rights); we
need not assume that such norms rest upon a foundationalist or essentialist
metaphysics.
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is my neighbor?"O7-seeking a precise delimitation of rights and
duties-Jesus replies with a question of his own, "Who is it that
proved himself neighbor?"98 As John Donahue sagely observes,
"Luke subtly alters the thrust of the parable." Jesus does not so
much answer the lawyer's question as "describe what it means to
be a neighbor, which then becomes the substance of [his]
counter-question in Luke 10:36, 'Which of these three, do you
think, was a neighbor to the man who fell into the hands of the
robbers?' -
Finally, it is neither the lawyer nor the reader who sets the
limits of love: "who is my neighbor?" even if the limits are
extended universally. One must rather answer Jesus' question-
become neighbor to the andwim, i.e. "what Ido." The distinctively
Christian virtue of solidarity thus defines the disciple's horizon of
discernment; for "to be a Christian," says Gustavo Gutirrrez, "is
to draw near, to make oneself a neighbor, not the one I encoun-
ter in my journey but the one in whose journey I place myself."1 °
Christianly, one must not only take the victim's side, for religious
ethics is not less than just; one must incarnate Jesus' compassion
in taking it as one's own, i.e., in what Walter Benjamin calls
"anamnestic solidarity.""1 1 And so, as in King's martyrdom, "the
defense of human rights" may entail the sacrifice of rights: What
is legally and morally supereragatory becomes, for the citizen of
faith, a response to a divine command, "Go and do likewise!" 102
CONCLUSION
Let me summarize the foregoing argument:
(i) In "public reasoning," normative validity claims (public
reasons) typically take the form of legal rights and duties, and
the corresponding civic or discursive virtues.
(ii) We may speak of a rational consensus inasmuch as citi-
zens recognize the set of such public reasons as binding and
legitimate in their respective judgments; i.e., claims satisfying citi-
97. Luke 10:29.
98. Luke 10:36.
99. John R. Donahue, Who is My Enemy? The Parable of the Good Samaritan
and the Love of Enemies, in THE LOVE OF ENEMY AND NON-RETALIATION IN THE NEW
TESTAMENT 144 (Willard M. Swartley ed., 1992).
100. Gustavo Guti6rrez, Towards a Theology of Liberation, in LIBERATION
THEOLOGY: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 74 (Alfred T. Hennelly ed., 1990) (1968).
101. See WALTER BENJAMIN, ILLUMINATIONS (Hannah Arendt ed., Harry
Zohn trans., Schocken Books 1969). Cf. THOMAS McCARTHY, IDEALS AND ILLU-
SIONSION RECONSTRUCTION AND DECONSTRUCTION IN CONTEMPORARY CRITICAL
THEORY 205-10 (1991).
102. Luke 10:37.
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zens' "best judgments." Claims/obligations would be heterono-
mous, conversely, if they are imposed independently of citizens'
rationally autonomous consent.
(iii) Citizens recognize the justificatory force of public rea-
sons for policy, even if they differ as to the ultimate grounds of
justification. Respecting citizens' rational autonomy is consistent
with recognizing (and respecting) multiple, even incommensura-
ble full comprehensive conceptions.
(iv) But human rights are not a moral Esperanto. What the
Universal Declaration affirms as our "faith in fundamental
human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person '"103
is typically grounded in comprehensive narrative traditions-
whether these be sacred, e.g., "Catholic moral-religious tradi-
tion," or secular, e.g., comprehensive liberalism. Public reasoning
translates our "thick" grounding reasons, e.g., religious faith, into
the properly political discourse of "thin" public reasons, e.g.,
political faith in rights.1 0 4
(v) Such grounding reasons likewise figure in the ongoing
interpretation/application of public reasons ("what we do" in
public reasoning): Citizens' mutual knowledge of their respective
comprehensive religious doctrines-what I have called religious
literacy, as a civic virtue of complex, pluralist polities-permits us
(a) to see whether policies stemming from such doctrines satisfy
the Rawlsian proviso; (b) to interpret action/policy falling under
the rubrics of rights, enriching our legal/moral inventory; and
(c) to rectify distortions or lacunae of our prevailing consensus.
(Such an exercise of deliberative tolerance, one hopes, serves
also to mitigate religious extremism).
(vi) In grounding and interpreting action, religious rea-
sons likewise move us to act. "Seeing and having compassion"10 5
both illumines the occasion of acting, and inspires appropriate
institutional redress where the victim is legion-in Jon Sobrino's
words, "a whole suffering people on the road."'0 6
103. GLENDON, supra note 73, at 175 (analyzing the Preamble to the Uni-
versal Declaration of Human Rights).
104. See, e.g., King, supra note 44, at 293-94 (discussing just and unjust
laws using the Christian framework of Augustine, Aquinas, and others, then
discussing "more concrete example[s]" of unjust laws using principles of basic
fairness and justice).
105. Luke 10:33.
106. JON SOBRINO ET AL., COMPANIONS OFJESus: THEJESUIT MARTYRS OF EL
SALVADOR 13 (1990). In King's words:
One day we must come to see that the whole Jericho road mustb,.,,
transformed so that men and women will not be constantly beaten and
robbed as they make theirjourney on life's highway. True compassion
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(vii) Finally, the surplus of religious reason, e.g., solidarity
with victims, inspires our public reasoning, especially where such
reason is systemically imperiled, e.g., under Jim Crow laws or
apartheid. We have martyrs for human rights. Not only, writes
Jon Sobrino, is "the struggle for human rights... an inescapable
imperative," for "anyone who believes in God .... The struggle
for human rights is an in actu concretization of our faith in
God."' 7 So perhaps, the vocation of the lawyer is inescapably
caught up in that larger vocation, the calling that "costs no less
than everything."10 ' Said Jesus to the lawyer: "Go and do like-
wise!" In Sobrino's words, "Instead of functioning as a mere the-
saurus of citations to be invoked in support of a particular
teaching-on human rights or anything else-scripture
becomes a demand and a challenge, yes, but then lucidity, inspi-
ration, and beatitude."10 9
is more than flinging a coin to a beggar .... It comes to see that an
edifice which produces beggars needs restructuring.
Martin Luther King, Jr., A Time to Break Silence (Apr. 4, 1967), in A TESTAMENT
OF HOPE, supra note 44, at 231, 241.
107. JON SOBRINO, SPIRITUALITY OF LIBERATION: TOWARD POLITICAL HOLI-
NESS 104 (Robert R. Barr trans., Orbis Books 1988) (1985).
108. See T.S. ELIOT, THE COMPLETE POEMS AND PLvS: 1909-1950, at 145
(1962).
109. SOBRINO, supra note 107, at 104.
